Incremental, Systemic and Paradigmatic Reform

Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, American Journal of International Law, Volume 112, Issue 3, July 2018

In the early days of the ISDS reform process, the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration had come under fire and become increasingly controversial. Although many states wished to change the system, which they saw as, among other things, costly and inconsistent, they had not (yet) converged on which reforms to pursue.

By following the developments in investor-state arbitration and the UNCITRAL working group tasked with investigating possible reform of the system, Anthea found that three main camps emerged in the early stages of the process:

  • incrementalists,

  • systemic reformers, and

  • paradigm shifters.

  • As the negotiations have progressed, the camps have shifted in a variety of ways.

    1. Incrementalists viewed the criticisms of the current system as overblown and argued that investor-state arbitration remained the best option available. Hence, they favored retaining the existing dispute resolution system but instituting modest reforms that would redress specific concerns.

    2. Systemic reformers saw merit in retaining investors’ ability to file claims directly on the international level, but viewed investor-state arbitration as a seriously flawed system for dealing with such claims. They championed more significant, systemic reforms, such as replacing investor-state arbitration with a multilateral investment court and an appellate body.

    3. Paradigm shifters dismissed the existing system as irrevocably flawed and in need of wholesale replacement. They rejected the utility of investors’ making international claims against states, whether before arbitral tribunals or international courts. They embraced a variety of alternatives, such as domestic courts, ombudsmen, and state-to-state arbitration.

    We capture these shifts in our blogs and articles.

Complex Designers and Emergent Design

Complex Designers and Emergent Design: Reforming the Investment Treaty System, American Journal of International Law, Volume 116, Issue 1, January 2022

In Complex Designers and Emergent Design, we conceptualize participants in the UNCITRAL ISDS Reform Working Group as complex designers, whose approach we characterize as one of emergent design, which is underpinned by three principles:

  • flexible structures,

  • balanced content, and

  • adaptive management processes.

In a dynamic era marked by unpredictability, division, and complex transnational challenges, how will emergent designs prove to be increasingly relevant in global governance?

The evolution of a flexible framework:
from initial sketch to digital image.

Our ideas about complex designers and emergent design grew out of a blog post published in October 2020. In our work on UNCITRAL we visualised a flexible framework for ISDS reform. Anthea first sketched the image for bringing the various reforms together on a napkin in a café in September 2019. It was then rendered digitally by CartoGIS at the ANU and used in our subsequent blogs and articles.

  • Is the investment treaty system more like a mechanical watch, in which you can pull out one part, repair it, then put it back together and know how it will work?

    Or is it more like an old forest or other ecosystem with lots of plants and animals and fungi interacting, so if you take out one part or add in a new part, you cannot necessarily predict what will happen?

    We think officials often see the investment treaty system as more like an ecosystem – it evolved over time rather than being consciously designed – which means that figuring out how to intervene in it most effectively can be hard and it is not easy or even possible to predict what will happen in response to interventions. We observed officials focusing on interactions, and how interactions lead to both unpredictability and emergent patterns. It was striking to us how often their language echoes descriptions of complex adaptive systems, so we turned to complexity theory to make sense of what we observed.

    Complexity theory is particularly helpful for asking ‘how’ questions. It captures the question we see negotiators asking themselves at UNCITRAL: given my state’s reform goals, how can I intervene in the investment treaty system most effectively?

    And when officials, like the officials we observe at UNCITRAL, believe that they are operating in an existing system that is full of interconnections that generate unpredictability and emergent patterns, what strategies are available to them to manage or shape the evolution of the system? We can also ask a more general version of this question: how do actors undertake institutional design in complex systems? And how should we conceptualize these actors who seek to redesign while keenly aware that they are operating within an existing complex adaptive system?

    We conceptualize UNCITRAL participants as complex designers: actors who see themselves operating within a complex system yet still seek to (re)design it. To explain the role of complex designers, we pick up on two of the metaphors used by participants at UNCITRAL: architecture and gardening.

    UNCITRAL participants often see themselves as architects, and talk about the ‘international architecture’ that they are building. These officials, like architects, see themselves with a rare opportunity to design new structures by drawing up blueprints. We call that engaging in episodic design. They are also designing for someone, for future users. Designs both shape and are shaped by their users in a coevolutionary manner. The structures that architects design can influence the identity and behaviour of users, but users may also ignore or work around structures they find problematic.

    UNCITRAL participants also invoke gardening metaphors, speaking about whether they should work on reforms that would permit an early harvest or are ripe for picking. The imagery of gardening draws our attention to the importance of environmental fit. These officials have a keen sense of what their domestic political environment can and cannot sustain and what the domestic political environments of others can and cannot sustain. The imagery of gardening also draws our attention to the reality that working with or against the environment is a continuing process. We call this adaptive management.

    Procedurally, architects remind us of the centrality of episodic design, while substantively they aim at designing structures with adaptive users in mind. Substantively, gardeners focus on the exigency of environmental fit, while procedurally they remind us of the need for continuous calibration through adaptive management.

    Most complex designers combine elements of both architecture and gardening, but the balance between the two can shift over time or by context.

    We argue that there is a coherence and logic underlying officials’ approach – they have adopted an evolutionary and experimental approach to reform. Evolutionary modes of change take place when several different versions of a rule or procedure appear, then some versions are selected and replicated but not others. Experimentation is necessary for evolution. We also develop three emergent design principles that we see as key to the approach: flexible structures, balanced content, and adaptive management processes.

The Originality of Outsiders

The Originality of Outsiders: Innovation in the Investment Treaty System, European Journal of International Law, Volume 33, Issue 4, November 2022

Why, in response to many of the same concerns about the legitimacy of ISDS, have states produced such a variety of reform proposals?

In this paper, we focus on one important but often overlooked factor: the ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ status of the government officials who formulate states’ proposals. We explore how individuals who have not spent their careers within the field of investment arbitration (and are perceived as ‘outsiders’ by those within that field) have developed more disruptive reform proposals while arbitral insiders have typically proposed sustaining reforms.

We illuminate these dynamics in the ISDS reform debates with case studies of four actors: the United States, the European Union, Bahrain, and Brazil.

 

Selection and Appointment

Selection and Appointment in International Adjudication: Lessons from Political Science, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Olof Larsson, Theresa Squatrito, Øyvind Stiansen, and Taylor St John, June 2022

This article summarizes insights from political science and empirical legal scholarship concerning selection and appointment of adjudicators to permanent international courts, drawing on data on 24 international courts to illustrate the different appointment procedures and institutional features.

 

Forum Recasting

Forum Recasting: A Strategy for Institutional Change (draft paper)

Can an international organization (IO) be recast? If so, how and with what consequences? In this paper, we introduce forum recasting as a strategy to change an institution by changing who acts within it.

We develop the concept of forum recasting by examining one case of it – the struggle to oust private sector actors and replace them with state officials at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Working Group III since 2017. We analyze recasting and responses to it through interviews with participants, attendance and speaking data, and para-ethnographic observation.